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COURT REPORTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Knox v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 434 F.3d 721 (4th Cir. 2006).
William Knox was employed by the United States Department of
the Interior ("DOI") as a Training Instructor at the National Park Service
Job Corps Center ("the Center") in Harper's Ferry, West Virginia. In
December 1999, Knox, during a safety inspection with an officer from the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), discovered
that some of the Center's buildings contained asbestos. Additionally,
Knox found an asbestos report from 1993 and an OSHA notice from
January 1999 that both identified asbestos in the buildings. Between
January and March 2000, Knox made several reports to management that
there was an asbestos problem. During this time, management threatened
Knox with a reduction in duties and pay. In response, Knox filed three
whistle-blower actions under the Clean Air Act ("CAA") with the Merit
Systems Board claiming that the threats were actually retaliation for his
reports about the asbestos problem. The whistle-blower provisions of the
CAA, found in 42 U.S.C. § 7622, prohibit "an employer from discharging
or discriminating against an employee for instituting proceedings for
enforcement of the Act or carrying out the purposes of the Act."
An Administrative Law Judge ("AL") first heard Knox's case and
held that the DOI had violated the whistle-blower provisions of the CAA.
The ALJ stated Knox had engaged in protected activities, the DOI knew of
the activities, and Knox "experienced adverse personnel actions solely
because of such activities." On appeal, the Administrative Review Board
("ARB") reversed the ALJ's decision. The ARB concluded the CAA is
concerned with pollution of the ambient air (external pollution) and Knox
reported concerns about internal pollution. Further, the ARB stated that
there was a requirement that Knox communicate to management that he
"reasonably believed that DOI was emitting asbestos into the ambient air"
and Knox had only expressed concerns about internal pollution. Based on
these facts, the ARB held that Knox had not engaged in a protected
activity under the CAA.
The Fourth Circuit held that the ARB improperly applied the
192

MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 2
"reasonable belief of a release into the ambient air" standard. The court
stated that, granting deference under Chevron, the ARB was permitted to
interpret the construction of the CAA. However, the Fourth Circuit found
that the ARB's standard is not always the proper standard because the
CAA can be violated without pollution being released into the ambient air.
Further, Knox's complaints were sufficient evidence that he reasonably
believed there was asbestos pollution and he didn't have to actually state
to management he reasonably believed it. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
held that Knox "ha[d] engaged in a protected activity under the CAA as
interpreted by the ARB."
ERIN C. BARTLEY

Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms Inc., 412 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2005).
The American Canoe Association ("ACA") brought suit under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") alleging that Murphy Farms was in violation
of the standards of the CWA. The district court determined that as a
citizen group the ACA needed to satisfy the requirements of section
505(a) of the CWA. The district court found that the ACA met all the
requirements of section 505(a) and thus was eligible to bring a citizen suit
against Murphy Farms.
Murphy Farms appealed the district court's finding. The appellate
court upheld the district court's holding. In reaching its decision the court
relied on various facts regarding Murphy Farm's previous violations of the
CWA. Murphy Farms had previously discharged swine wastewater into a
nearby creek on five separate occasions. Two of the spills had occurred
prior to the filing of this suit in 1998. These two incidents occurred
because of Murphy Farms' negligent operation of spraying equipment.
The equipment was used to spray swine slop on the fields; the slop acted
as a fertilizer.. The last three instances also occurred because of negligent
operation of the same spraying equipment. The last instance occurred
February 5, 2000. For each of these instances, the district court held that
"there were fewer responsible and competent land techs employed and/or
on duty than were required to operate the hog waste management system
in compliance with the Clean Water Act." Thus, it was highly likely that
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MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 2
Murphy Farms would continue to violate the CWA.
Section 505(a) of the CWA states that, "any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person . .. who is

alleged to be in violation of the standards of the Act." In interpreting this
phrase, the appeals court relied on a previous United States Supreme Court
decision that stated a citizen suit under the CWA may not be premised
solely on past violations of the Act. In order to bring a citizen suit, the
group must show a continuous or intermittent violation that shows the
violator will continue to pollute in the future. The group must prove either
(1) that the violations will continue after the date on which the complaint
is filed, or (2) by showing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude a continuing likelihood of recurring violations. There is a
continuing likelihood of recurring violations until the there is no real
likelihood of repetition.
The court found that the ACA had properly shown that Murphy
Farms had not eliminated the likelihood of recurring violations. In order
to correct this deficiency, Murphy Farms need not show that it has
eliminated any possibility of a violation. It only needs to show that it has
taken steps that eliminate the "real likelihood of repetition." Once
Murphy Farms proves there is no real likelihood of repetition, the federal
court will not have jurisdiction to hear a citizen suit against them.

AMY L. OHNEMUS
United States v. John Chamness, 435 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2006).
Congress poignantly noted that illicit methamphetamine
production "poses serious dangers to both human life and the
environment." As a result the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of
2000 called for more rigid sentencing if a methamphetamine offense
created a substantial risk of harm to human life.
John Chamness was found producing methamphetamine in an
Illinois trailer park during the summer of 2003. Chamness pled guilty on
two counts of knowingly attempting to manufacture a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C §§
841(a)(1) and 846. In accordance with the November 1, 2004 United
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States Sentencing Guidelines the district court found Chamness' offense
warranted a three-level increase for creating a substantial risk of harm to
human life or the environment.
The first police officer that entered the mobile home discovered a
clandestine methamphetamine lab. The lab was complete with glass jars
of methamphetamine, muriatic acid, Coleman stove fuel, peeled lithium
batteries, an air pump, salt, and a toxic, white ether fog that engulfed the
living room/kitchen area.
In conformity with Drug Enforcement
Administration guidelines the police arranged for a hazardous waste
disposal team to secure the trailer.
The substantial risk of harm is weighed according to the following
criteria: the quantity of hazardous/toxic substances found at the laboratory,
the likelihood of release into the environment, the extent and duration of
the manufacturing operation, and the location of the laboratory. The Court
of Appeals reasoned that the need for a hazardous waste disposal team to
disassemble and the quantity of toxic substances warranted sentence
enhancement. Chamness' argument that he was involved in the less
dangerous second gassing phase, as opposed to the initial process
involving anhydrous ammonia, was unpersuasive. The government did
not introduce evidence as to how Chamness intended to dispose of the
toxic chemicals. Therefore, the likelihood of release into the environment
factor was indeterminate. Expert testimony that only 30 percent of
methamphetamine producers are sophisticated enough to perform the
second stage showed the operation's extent was considerable. The
trailer's location within a residential area placed several people at risk of
serious injuries from explosion or fire.
After examining the first, third, and fourth factors together the
Court of Appeals found that Chamness placed numerous persons at
substantial risk of harm. The concurrent 168 months of imprisonment
sentence for each count was upheld.
SETH D. OKSANEN

United States v. Gurley. 434 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2006).
Gurley owned and operated a hazardous waste site in Edmondson,
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Arkansas and a site in West Memphis, Arkansas. The Environmental
Protection Agency brought action against Gurley's refining company and
Gurley as an individual pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The EPA sought to recover
the clean-up costs associated with oil waste pits and filed for declaratory
judgment for liability at the Edmondson site for future response costs. In
March 1992, judgment was entered against Gurley and his company for
$1.7 million as well as an estimated $6 million in pre-judgment interest
and future response costs. In July 1995, he filed for bankruptcy in Florida.
The government later filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court and for
the response costs and interest at the Edmondson site based on the existing
judgment and declaratory judgment.
The government also sought
response costs for the West Memphis site. Gurley filed an objection to the
proof of claim and then filed a motion in the Middle District of Florida to
withdraw the reference of the contested matter from the bankruptcy court
to the district court.
The district court granted the motion and
subsequently transferred venue to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas. The district court entered judgment against
Gurley and denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment on the claim
that the interest calculation start date was incorrect.
Gurley then appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Gurley appealed on two grounds. First, he claimed that the court had no
subject matter jurisdiction. Second, Gurley claimed that the action was
never commenced because the government had failed to serve him with a
complaint and therefore any properly filed complaint would be timebarred.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Gurley's objection to the
government's proof of claim. District courts may reference bankruptcy
cases to bankruptcy courts and when a resolution of the case requires
consideration of title 11 and other laws of the United States affecting
regulation of interstate commerce, the district court may withdraw
reference of the proceedings to the bankruptcy court in the case of a timely
motion. However, withdrawing the reference and returning adjudication
of a proof of claim to the district court does not affect the district court's
subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court also found that the district court had personal
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jurisdiction over Gurley. Because the government participated in the
bankruptcy proceeding via the filing of its proof of claim, and the
proceeding was in rem, there was no need to establish personal jurisdiction
over Gurley.
Additionally, the government's filing of proof of claim was not
barred based on the amount of time elapsed because the government filed
the proof of claim, which constituted the requirement that the government
act in order to recover costs under CERCLA.
Finally, the district court properly declined to address the prejudgment interest issue since Gurley failed to raise this argument before he
filed his motion to alter or amend the judgment. Thus the district court did
not abuse its discretion by not addressing those arguments Gurley
presented.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment entered against Gurley as well as the district court's denial of
Gurley's motion for reconsideration.
TRAvIs A. ELLIOTT
Sierra Club v. Johnson, No. 03-10262, 2006 WL 146230 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Sierra Club and Georgia Forestwatch, collectively "Sierra
Club," petitioned for review of the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") decision to deny their request that the EPA object to the granting
of four Clean Air Act ("CAA") Title V permits. The four permits were
issued by the Georgia Environmental Protection Division ("GEPD"). In
order to ensure compliance with the CAA's quality-control standards,
Title V requires stationary sources of air pollution to obtain permits from
state permitting authorities, which include emission limitations and other
conditions.
State permitting authorities must provide the public at least 30 days
to comment on the permits and must give notice by newspaper publication
of any public hearing or in a state publication, to individuals on a mailing
list developed by the permitting authority, and by other means if necessary
to ensure adequate notice. GEPD, exercising its permit authority,
published a notice in a local newspaper announcing a 30-day comment
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period on the draft Title V permit for an area manufacturer that chemically
processes and prints cotton and synthetic fabrics. GEPD failed to create a
mailing list until after the time for public comment on the draft permit had
expired. Thus, it failed to comply with the mailing list requirement
provided in 40 C.F.R. § 70.7(h)(1).
The Sierra Club brought the lack of mailing list notice to the
attention of GEPD. Due to the failure to provide mailing list notice, the
Sierra Club requested that the manufacturer's permit go through the
notification process again.
GEPD refused, asserting that "its
implementation of a mailing list after it had issued [the manufacturer's]
permit sufficiently addressed the Sierra Club's concerns." The Sierra
Club subsequently requested that the EPA object to the permit because of
the lack of the mailing list notice. The EPA denied the request, asserting
that the mailing list would not have "significantly" increased public
participation. The Sierra Club then filed a petition with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, contending that the EPA's failure to
object was in direct opposition to the unambiguous language of Title V.
As a threshold matter, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Sierra
Club had standing to assert the present claim. The court then tackled the
case's main issue and agreed with the Sierra Club, determining that the
EPA was in error to assert that "it can avoid its own unambiguous mailing
list requirement in the Title V permitting process" and "ignore obvious
violations of [the] permit program."
Furthermore, the court was
unconvinced by the EPA's implicit assertion that the burden should be
placed on the Sierra Club to show that statutory non-adherence led to "less
meaningful public participation." The court vacated the EPA's order
concerning the permit process and remanded the case to the EPA for
further consideration.
ERic S. OELRICH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
City of Moses Lake v. United States, No. CV-04-03760AAM, 2005 WL
3724919 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 30, 2005).
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Beginning in 1999, the EPA began the planning process to address
contamination at the former Larson Air Force Base, currently owned by
the City of Moses Lake ("the City"). Under 42 U.S.C. § 9620, the EPA
was required to provide the City with all relevant information concerning
the proposed plan and to allow the City to participate in the planning and
selection of a remedy at the site. The City filed suit in the Eastern District
of Washington, seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief
against the EPA, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and other governmental
agencies for failure to include the City as required by the statute.
The court first had to address whether the City's claim was
jurisdictionally barred. At issue was the application of the text of 42
U.S.C. § 9613 to § 9620. The text of section 9613 presents a jurisdictional
bar to civil suits if the proposed plan is a CERCLA removal action on
federal property. However, if the proposed action was remedial, the
jurisdiction bar would be inapplicable. The statutory language, the court
found, required a distinction between removal and remedial actions in
regard to the jurisdictional bar issue.
After careful review of the statutory language, the definitions of
removal and remedial in the statute, and relevant case law on the
difference between the two, the court determined that "the
removal/remedial distinction boils down to whether the ... EPA did not
have time to undertake the procedural steps required for a remedial action,
and, in responding to a time-sensitive threat, the EPA sought to minimize
and stabilize imminent harms to human health and the environment." The
court found in this case the proposed plan was a remedial action, so the
statutory bar did not apply. The City was free to pursue its claims and
relief.
The court next found the proposed plan by the EPA constituted a
"planning" and/or an "action plan." The EPA intended to issue the
proposed plan to the public at large, without first notifying the city, and
argued this gave the City the required notice and participation under the
statute. However, the court found that once the proposed plan is issued to
the public at large, the "planning" stage is over and the remedy selection
phase begins. The City argued that it, along with the rest of the public, was
already entitled to notice of formal issuance of the proposed plan and that
it had the right to tender comment regarding the plan. The court held that
without reviewing the proposed plan and its alternative remedies
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(including the EPA's preferred remedy) before issuance to the public,
there was simply no way for the City of Moses Lake to meaningfully and
intelligently "participate in the planning and selection of the remedial
action ... and the development of . . . action plans." Once the plan had
been publicly issued, the planning stage was over, and the City had been
denied its rights.
If the EPA were permitted to follow its intended course of action
and only disseminate the plan to the City after it was complete, the court
found that the City would be irreparably harmed and fully denied its rights
under § 9620. Therefore, the court issued a preliminary injunction against
the EPA and other named defendants, ordering the dissemination of the
proposed plan to the City within 10 days of the order, and outlined
timetables for consultation between the two. The court noted that while
the City may participate, the final decision on the course of action rests
with the federal government.
NATALEE

M. BINKHOLDER

STATE COURTS
Price ex. rel. Massey v. Hickory Point Bank & Trust, 841 N.E.2d 1084
(111. App. Ct. 2006).
In November 2001, a physician identified elevated levels of lead in
the blood of one-year-old twins, Mikal and Mikala Price. The physician
notified the Macon County Health Department, which conducted an
investigation at the children's residence in Decatur, Illinois. The health
department found lead hazards on windows, baseboards, and doorjambs in
the house where the children lived. The health department informed the
twin's parents' landlords about its findings and gave the defendant
landlords one month to take care of the lead issues in the house.
David Massey, as guardian of the twin's estate, brought suit against
defendants, alleging negligent violations of the Decatur Municipal Code
and certain EPA regulations that apply provisions of the federal
Residential Lead-based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992.
In June 2005, the trial court entered an order granting summary
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judgment to defendants. The trial court reasoned that defendants could not
be held liable for lead-based paint contamination because they had no
knowledge that the house contained lead-based paint before being notified
of its existence by the Macon County Health Department. Plaintiffs
appealed the grant of summary judgment, and the Illinois Appellate Court
reversed. The appellate court held that Massey did not have to show that
the landlords knew they had violated the city code and EPA regulations in
order to establish a prima facie case of negligence.
In ruling that plaintiffs did not have to show that defendants had
knowledge of lead in the house, or that they knew about their duty to
provide the twin's parents with a lead warning statement or an information
pamphlet, the court referred to case law regarding common-law
negligence claims based on a violation of a statute or ordinance. The court
cited several cases, each holding that a violation of a statute which is
designed to protect human life, without more, is prima facie evidence of
negligence. In order to establish this prima facie case, a plaintiff must
make out three elements. First, a plaintiff must show that he is a member
of the class of persons the statute is designed to protect. Second, he must
show that his injury is of the type the statute is designed to protect against.
Third, the defendant's violation of the statute must have been the
proximate cause of the plaintiff s injury. The plaintiff need not allege that
the defendant was aware of his duty under the statute as the violation itself
is prima facie evidence of negligence.
The appellate court also looked to the language of section 745.118
of the EPA, which provides, "[f]ailure to comply with § 745.107
(disclosure requirements for sellers and lessors), § 745.110 (opportunity to
conduct an evaluation), § 745.113 (certification and acknowledgment of
disclosure), or § 745.115 (agent responsibilities) is a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(5) and of the Toxic Substance Control Act § 409." The
appellate court noted that the EPA regulations defendants were charged
with violating did not include knowledge requirements.
For these reasons, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the
landlords' failure to provide the lessees with a lead warning statement and
an information pamphlet was sufficient for plaintiffs to make their prima
facie case, regardless of defendants' lack of knowledge about the lead in
the house or their statutory duties. Therefore, the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to defendants was in error. The case was reversed and
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remanded.
This opinion also explained why the trial court violated the
Supreme Court Rule on citation of unpublished orders. That explanation
was not material to the disposition of the current case.
LEAH M. CLUBB

F.W. Disposal South, LLC v. St. Louis County, 168 S.W.3d 607 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005).
In what was alleged to be an effort to protect the environment and
maintain public health, St. Louis County enacted an ordinance targeted to
prevent F.W. Disposal South ("FWDS") from constructing a solid waste
facility within one thousand feet of a church. FWDS, originally under the
name of a parent company, sought declaratory judgment to prevent the
county from enforcing the ordinance. The trial court held that the
ordinance was invalid and granted summary judgment to FWDS. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri affirmed
the trial court's ruling and held that the ordinance was enacted primarily
for zoning purposes. The Court of Appeals found the county failed to
follow its own procedure, which required notice and comment, for the
creation of zoning ordinances, thus rendering the ordinance at issue
invalid.
Initially, FWDS filed an application to operate a solid waste
transfer facility within one thousand feet of a church. In response, St.
Louis County drafted Ordinance ("SLCRO") Section 607.805 prohibiting
the construction of any transfer station or waste processing facility within
one thousand feet of a church, residential area, school, nursery school,
child care center, or nursing home and subsequently denied the
application.
At issue is whether the ordinance was for public safety, which falls
under the "police powers" of the county, or for land use regulation,
requiring much stricter ordinance implementation procedure. On appeal,
the county argued the ordinance was for public safety purposes, which
includes environmental and health concerns. The court disagreed finding
that the ordinance restricted the use of land according to location. The
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court noted that the ordinance did not describe the environmental or health
impacts of such facilities, nor was the stated purpose of the ordinance to
protect public safety. Instead, the court found that this was an example of
"not in my backyard" complaints resulting in the ordinance being crafted
to promote the development of real estate and not to protect the health of
those near the site.
The court also noted that before St. Louis County enacted the
ordinance, the land could be used for waste transfer purposes, but now the
ordinance prohibited this use. Such an action is consistent with zoning
regulation, which in St. Louis County requires notice and comment. The
court held that because there was no notice and comment prior to enacting
the ordinance, it was therefore invalid and not a sufficient reason for
denying FWDS's application.
This decision limits the ability of counties, municipalities and
other divisions to write health ordinances under their "police powers,"
forcing them instead to follow the rules of zoning ordinance
construction. Apparently, under this ruling, a county must include an
environmental or health analysis when writing an ordinance that could be
construed as zoning if the purpose is public safety. Lastly, the court noted
that had this ordinance been enacted simultaneously with other provisions
that directly regulate solid waste, perhaps the court's ruling would be
different. Such a suggestion indicates that if a county wishes to regulate
the location of potential health or environmental offenders, it must do so
in a way that includes ordinances written strictly for such purposes that do
not include zoning language.
G. MICHAEL BROWN
Nixon v. Alternate Fuels. Inc. 181 S.W.3d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
The State of Missouri brought a collection action against Alternate
Fuels, Inc. ("AFI"), a Kansas corporation, for penalties, interest, and fees
on assessments made after AFI's Missouri land reclamation permits had
expired. AFI obtained permits from the Missouri Land Reclamation
Commission ("MLRC"), under the Department of Natural Resources,
beginning in 1990 for the operation of the Blue Mound Mine. AFI
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operated the Blue Mound facility until 1996 when the facility was turned
over to Cimarron Energy LLC; AFI, however, continued to hold the
permits.
During the time in which AFI maintained control of the Blue
Mound Mine, a DNR inspector conducted several inspections on the
permitted area and found that the land did not comply with the reclamation
laws, regulations, or rules. These violations included failure to backfill
and grade the land within time frames provided by regulation to control
soil erosion, the absence of a plan to address the acidity and toxicity of
exposed soils, and failure to report on the quality of the water in the
affected area. The inspectors issued several notices indicating the specified
deadlines for compliance. AFI did not renew the permits, and the only
activity that has occurred at Blue Mound since the end of 2001 is
reclamation, which the federal government has inspected and enforced.
MLRC issued orders of assessment against AFI, and neither AFI
nor Cimarron paid any of the penalties due. The MLRC then requested
that the Attorney General seek collection of the penalties with interest and
attorney's fees. The present action followed, naming AFT as defendant;
Cimarron was not made a party to the action.
At the trial court level, the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri
ruled in favor of AFI holding that the MLRC lacked jurisdiction to lay
assessments against AFI after the permit expiration. On appeal the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held that the MLRC is
a state program that is approved by the federal government as it complies
with the federal Surface Coal Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 ("SMCRA"). The court additionally held that MLRC "must be no
less effective than the federal program." The court also noted the Missouri
Legislature's intent to mirror the federal act and its intent to, "protect the
environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining while
ensuring an adequate supple of coal to meet the nation's energy
requirements." The court then examined the federal regulation and held
that it "does not expressly prohibit or grant the MLRC authority to assess
penalties against a non-renewed permittee." The court further held that
AFI was correctly treated as a permittee since it was an expired permittee
and reclamation was occurring on its permitted land. The court held that
the orders issued against AFI were proper as long as reclamation activity
was occurring on the permitted land. The court accordingly found that the
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trial judge's ruling and statement of the law was erroneous. The case was
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
ERIK G. HOLLAND
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